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context of colonialism and postcolonial state formation in the Horn of Africa. These narratives addressed an international as much as a national or local audience. The paper's focus is on the latter. 5 It shows that the quest for nationalism and popular sovereignty in Somalia was enmeshed with a genealogical myth and framed as a special version of Somaliness (Somalinimo), which underscored postcolonial statebuilding. This ethno-nationalism was then entangled with and partly superseded by the modernisation narrative. The section ends with an analysis of the discursive strategies and framing battle between the armed opposition and the state in the 1980s.
The article will then address the civil war and outline how experience of violence forced all actors to retreat from political to cultural or clan-based frames. I argue that the simplifying, reductionist and expansionist characteristics of 'culturalised' frames initiated a dynamic of violence that led to enormous destruction. In the long run, however, clan-frames alone were not sufficient in justifying claims to power and required additional narratives about 'injustice', 'modernisation' and 'territorial rights'. The last section deals with the discursive repertoires that Commission was mandated to examine the future of the Italian Empire, and Great Britain proposed to transfer the BMA into an UN Trusteeship. The proposal was discussed within the BMA and contributed to the rise of an independence movement spearheaded by the Somali Youth League (SYL). Within a few years, the SYL had mobilised a national and anti-colonial mass movement. 6 When the Four Power Commission convened hearings in Mogadishu in 1948 4 to consider the opinions of the Somali population, the SYL submitted a memorandum that summarised its nationalist ambitions:
We wish our country to be amalgamated with the other Somalilands and to form one political, administrative and economic unit with them. We Somalis are one in every way. We are the same racially and geographically, we have the same culture, we have the same language and the same religion. There is no future for us except as part of a Greater Somalia.
[…] By this union only can we have the opportunity to give full expression to our national spirit and wore out our destiny as a nation of normal human beings. Union with the other Somalilands is our greatest demand which must take priority over all other considerations. 7 Revolving around a set of joint cultural characteristics and practices (language and religion) rather than on political motifs, the SYL built their pan-Somali nationalism on a case for collective ethnic identity ('we Somalis are one'). Nationalism was conceptualised as a natural and inevitable outcome (the 'destiny') of this shared identity, which sought, so they argued, to realise itself in an independent state comprising all Somali populated territories ('our destiny as a nation of normal human beings'). Religion was discursively integrated and became part of the ethno-nationalist narrative. Islam, and the belief in a common Arabic-Muslim ancestor, is deeply intertwined with the genealogical myth and for this reason adherence to Islam was interpreted as further affirmation of cultural homogeneity and thus the ethnic/nationalist identity of Somalis.
The SYL nevertheless defined itself as secular movement and largely refrained from mobilising religious sentiments. 8 However, far from being the 'natural' or 'inevitable' outcome of a common ethnic identity, the ethno-nationalist discourse and political dominance of the SYL was challenged by other Somali groups, most prominently the Hizbia Digil Mirifle (HDM), which comprised people of two southern clans (Digil and Mirifle). While testifying before the Four Power Commission, the founder of the HDM explained:
My people are those who behave themselves better than others. We always prevent other people from making trouble or robbing.
[…] About conditions in our country, I wish to request three things. First we wish to have peace and security and secondly we want the country in which we live to always be regarded as belonging to us, and if the government who live with us wish anything from us we want it to be discussed with us. The other people who are not Dighil and Mirifle people think they may live and stay with us, but we want them behind us recognizing the land as belonging to us and not to them. 9 The HDM founder emphasised the social and cultural differences between northern pastoralists and southern (semi-nomadic or settled) agro-pastoralists, thereby undermining the very foundation of the SYL's ethno-nationalist frame, the diagnosis of cultural homogeneity and the existence of a joint Somali identity. The nationalist, pan-Somali narrative was seen as an attempt by pastoral groups to expand their rule in Digil and Mirifle territories and increase their power in the BMA and the future Somali state.
At the core of this framing competition was a struggle for power and leadership. The SYL used the ethno-nationalist frame to mobilise support for its version of a Greater Somalia (if not independent then at least under British administration) and to secure their leadership in the state.
The HDM hoped that the return of Italian rule would prevent the pastoralists' territorial expansion and safeguard the interests of Somali agro-pastoralists, 10 particularly control over their land. While the narratives of both organisations also aimed at attracting international support, most notably from Italy (HDM) and Great Britain (SYL), they also targeted a different public within Somalia. The explicit clan base of the HDM confined its audience to members of the Digil and Mirifle clans whereas the SYL was able to spread its ideas and mobilise support among the broader Somali population. Ethnic nationalism resonated well with the lived experience of Somalis as a kinship-based society. The idea of a special Somaliness built on the genealogical myth of a common ancestor and marshalled the highest genealogical level of the segmentary lineage system 11 for the first time in Somali history. 12 The organisational efficiency of the SYL further contributed to its success. Upon the arrival of the Four Power Commission in Mogadishu in 1948 they were greeted by mass demonstrations for Somali independence. The demonstrations turned violent after Italians organised a counterdemonstration. The 1949 UN decision to re-divide Somalia along the lines of its earlier colonial borders and place the former Italian colony under a ten-year UN Trusteeship equally led to a wave of demonstrations and riots throughout the Somali territories. The idea of an ethnically based nationalism was by that time already deeply embedded in the discursive and symbolic repertoires of Somalis in the Horn of Africa. 13 Despite the societal divisions that today characterise the war-torn Somali society, the narratives of ethnic and cultural homogeneity are still repeated and reconfirmed inside and outside Somalia, in street conversations as well as in political and academic debates and Somalia is often described as among the most culturally homogenous countries in Africa. What we are striving to create is a nationalism of oneness … the Somali and the foreigner cannot be equated. Somalism is the inherent bond that ties the Somalis together and puts their common interest in a nutshell. 16 The speech also indicates the inherent xenophobic potential of the ethno-nationalist discourse, as it promotes demarcation from and builds upon a general suspicion of foreigners or non-Somalis.
Postcolonial Formation and Basic State Stories
Ethno-nationalism framed the irredentist ambitions of Somalia's consecutive governments and led to a series of border clashes with neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia. These military confrontations strained the state budget, which led to a rapprochement between Somalia and its neighbours after 1967, a move which illustrates the successive subordination of the pannationalist idea to development. Neither ethno-nationalist nor anti-colonial rhetoric disappeared in Somalia, but both were increasingly tied to a modernisation narrative. 17 Development and modernisation became keywords in the postcolonial world. Modernisation was conceptualised as a pathway of (linear) progress leading a society from a traditional past into a modern future. Tradition was thus framed in direct opposition to modernity, and practices attributed to it denounced as backward and as obstacles that had to be overcome. Despite the continuous emphasis on ethnic homogeneity and unity, the Somali governments (like most African governments) 18 had to deal with a fragmented polity. Everyday life and governance in Tribalism was the only way in which foreigners got their chance of dividing our people. We will close all roads used by colonialists to enter our country and into our affairs. We will build up a great Somali nation, strongly united and welded together to live in peace. 20 A nationwide campaign to eliminate tribalism became part of the carefully orchestrated propaganda machinery of the military government. 21 Siyaad Barre urged 'all Somalis to wage war against tribalism', 22 and the guiding slogan 'Tribalism divides -Socialism unites' was continuously repeated in speeches and aired on national radio. The postcolonial elites also mandated themselves with the enlightenment of the 'unlettered citizenry'. 23 The SYL had already promised 'to educate the youth in modern civilization', 24 The initiators of the coup were publicly denounced as unpatriotic and as henchmen of the Ethiopian 'black colonialists'. He addressed the nation shortly after the coup:
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We have constantly been aware that colonialism -which has many faces, both old and new -has wanted all along to stir up chaos in the country. We knew that they had their lackeys inside the country and that [word indistinct] they were taking orders from them.
[…] You must be vigilant against colonialism, whether the new or the old; be more cohesive in your unity, which the foreign nations are anxious to destroy in their own interests. 32 Barre's message was simple and evocative. The crisis was attributed to the 'new' Ethiopian colonialists, which were accused of directing the Somali opposition ('Ethiopia's lackeys') from behind the scenes. Siyaad Barre then appealed to the nation, urging the public to remain vigilant and defend Somalia from the imperialists within the country. The anti-colonial discourse was simultaneously used to justify the state's actions against opposing groups and to reaffirm the unity and cohesion of its citizens.
Some of the military officers involved in the coup escaped punishment and fled to Ethiopia where they formed the first militia, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The SSDF published 1983 a political programme which was coloured by Marxist rhetoric and seemed to be oriented more towards its main donors -Ethiopia, Libya and potentially the Soviet Union -than towards the Somali population. 33 The fact that the SSDF operated from and was financially and associates, were endowed with enormous power and were frequently involved in large-scale human rights violations. 35 Among the newly applied technologies of governance was the clanbased prosecution of opponents. People with a Darood/Majerteen clan background, the clan to which the founder of the SSDF and the majority of SSDF members belonged, were now collectively blamed for the rebellion. 36 The government launched a 'scorched earth policy' against the Majerteen, and initiated the first step towards the clanisation -or to use a broader term 'culturalisation' 37 -of violence that would later characterise the civil war in Somalia.
When Diaspora Somalis formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, another militia which joined the SSDF in the armed struggle, the government resorted to previously established methods, denouncing the SNM as unpatriotic, pro-Ethiopian and enemies of the Somali nation.
Relying again on clan-based techniques, the government's blame fell on the Isaaq, from which the SNM drew most of its supporters and recruits. The anti-Isaaq rhetoric was complemented by action: house searches, nightly curfews and mass arrests which often led to mass executions. 38 The political orientation and rhetoric of the SNM remained embedded in the modernisation narrative. The government was blamed for the economic failure, which was attributed to its 'dynastic and clan-based' structure. 39 As First of all, the struggle of the SNM is a people's struggle. It is also a just struggle that most of the Somali people identify with. I would like to make it clear today that the SNM is not a tribal organization. On the contrary, SNM is a national organization with purely national strategy and objectives […] . Every Somali person who gets convinced that SNM is an alternative to the existing system and who respects its constitution and principles is welcomed to join the national liberation. It is written in the front and foremost lines of its constitution that SNM is a political opposition organization dedicated to the total liberation of Somalia from the oppressive regime of Siyad Barre.
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Presenting the aim as national liberation placed the SNM in a direct continuum with the anticolonial struggle. Overall, the SNM remained programmatically and politically rather vague, which provided the organisation with the necessary flexibility to attract supporters with differing and often contradicting ideologies, united mainly by the goal of ending military rule.
THE END OF AMBIVALENCE: CULTURALISATION OF VIOLENCE
Siyaad Barre's increasingly clanist politics contributed to the successive replacement of ethnonationalist narratives with discourses that emphasised differences between clans. He tried to rally people from the Darood clan family, 42 ignoring the fact that people with a Darood/Majerteen background had only recently been branded as national enemies. The Darood were now portrayed as defenders of the Somali state. 43 The government for example armed refugees from Darood/Ogadeen clans to fight the SNM in the North, and patronised smaller and rather powerless clan groups to maintain their support. 44 Clan based state repression reached its peak in Barre and his associates, but the Mareexaan in general who were collectively blamed for the war, the repressions, the economic decline and any other failure of the military government. 46 The power and devastating consequences culturalist frames are able to unleash could soon be experienced all over Somalia. 47 To the dismay of all, immediately on the removal of the dictator from power; exploiting the unforeseen rapid collapse of the regime and some differences within the USC; the Manifesto Group 50 […] hastened to unilaterally take over the reins of power appointing themselves as an interim government and also claiming as being USC leadership. The group who are composed of ex-politicians in the 1950s and 1960s, former civil servants, members of the former regime and merchants all grew rich under the regime ventured this action without consultation and regard whatsoever to USC rank and file; ardent struggle and tremendous abnegation and hardship they underwent for the sake of democracy, justice, peace and progress.
The Manifesto members who supported Ali Mahdi's interim rule were characterised as beneficiaries of the former governments, accused of clinging to power and seizing the spoils of war. People from Ali Mahdi's Hawiye/Abgaal clan were charged with being late in joining the fight (during the Mogadishu upheaval) and only when the demise of the government was already inevitable. 51 The injustice of the current rule was emphasised, and negative narration of the Other was complemented by the glorification of heroic war activities and the willingness of USC members to sacrifice their life for the greater good.
Ali Mahdi in contrast used his position as self-declared president to appeal to nationalist sentiments and asked the people to stop fighting and rebuild the country. The inclusion of highranking officials from the military regime in the new government was framed as the beginnings of reconciliation and a necessary step in rebuilding the unity of the Somali nation. General
Aydiid was in contrast characterised as a military hardliner, unable to reconcile and lacking the political sensitivity to lead the country towards peace and state-building. 52 In contrast to the 'fighter' and 'heroic war hero' image of Aydiid's camp, the group around Ali
Mahdi pointed out that the final victory was not achieved by the militias but by the people in Mogadishu. They explicitly warned against the militias, which they acknowledged as good warriors, but at the same time depicted as uncontrollable and ungovernable. This view is illustrated by Osmaan Ato, a businessman who ironically supported General Aydiid's USC before he formed his own militia:
The USC was organized with people from the bush. But bush and town are too different, and nobody can control the bushman. If he steals a car, he might not give it to the USC. It was not planned by the USC to loot, but the decentralized groups have done it. After years fighting in the bush, the USC failed to stop the lootings and atrocities. The militias should have stayed out of town. 53 Embedded in the wider modernisation narrative is the ontological division between nature and culture, which found in Somalia a geographical expression in the binary opposition between 'bush' and 'town', 54 the former the home of individualistic and ungovernable nomads (the 'people from the bush'), the latter an expression of civilisation, control and order. This division gave rise to an ambivalent urban attitude oscillating between a romanticised adoration of the nomad's courage and freedom, amusement over their ignorance, and paternalistic demonstrations of their own (educated and rational) superiority. The town-bush binary was now added as an additional rim 55 to the clan-based frame and translated into absolute characteristics which represented clan segments with urban backgrounds (such as Ali Mahdi's Hawiye/Abgaal clan) and segments with rural-pastoral backgrounds (Aydiid's Hawiye/Habr Gedir clan). General
Aydiid's USC militias were discredited as uncontrollable and ungovernable 'people from the bush,' and stories about their dullness 56 and belligerence were used to rationalise their inability to rule. To this day, the belligerent character of nomads is used as an argument for the protracted violence and instability in Somalia. 57 Both USC wings managed to mobilise fighters and alliances and from November 1991 to March 1992 they entered into a devastating war against each other. In less than three months 14,000
people died and 27,000 were left severely injured. 58 Meanwhile, Siyaad Barre started to reorganise the crumbling security forces from the Mareexaan clan to form the Somali National
Front (SNF) and marched twice, in April 1991 and April 1992, from southern Gedo towards
Mogadishu in an attempt to recapture the capital. He was not successful, but initiated the expansion of the war from Mogadishu to southern and central Somalia.
Ongoing violence, together with a drought, led to a severe famine and to the first humanitarian intervention led by the United Nations (UN). The failure of the UN intervention is well documented. 59 After the withdrawal of UN forces in 1995, localised forms of authority based on rather loose arrangements between clan-militias, business people, clan elders and religious leaders emerged throughout Somalia. 60 Many people now fled to regions populated mainly by people from their own clan and controlled by a local clan militia. They soon referred to these regions as 'home regions' or 'areas of origin'. The entanglement of genealogical affiliation with notions of territoriality and origin resulted in the creation of new discursive repertoires in which to be 'born in' (ku dhashay) a region was added as another layer (or rim) to the cultural frame of being 'born to' (u dhashay) a clan and both were used to legitimise or contest political rights. 61 Given the enormous demographic shifts caused by the expansionist movements of pastoralists, the commercialisation of agricultural, postcolonial institution-building, the in-migration of Somali refugees and of course the waves of internal displacements during the civil war, territorial claims gave rise to rather absolutist notions of 'autochthony'. In Mogadishu, for example, the 'Darood dictatorship' was combined with the narration of their allochthony, in other words, the fact that they did not belong to the city. 62 In the discourse on 'people from the bush' outlined above, the Hawiye/Abgaal claimed autochthony as the 'original' inhabitants of Mogadishu. In talks in Mogadishu and Kismaayo in 2002-03, people often referred to colonial clan maps to legitimise or contest the 'historic right' of particular clans to govern a city. 63 In the southern Somali Gedo region, power struggles between people from the same clan were framed as a confrontation between 'autochtonous' (Guuri) people with a vested right to govern and newcomers (Galti) whose rights were contested or denied. 64 In the more recent conflicts over the establishment of a Jubbaland administration, internet forums were full of comments about historical claims to ownership by the various Darood and Hawiye clans in the three regions that were united to the Interim Juba Administration.
In the war clan affiliation provided the primary frame for assigning responsibility for recognised problems and for defining friends and foes. However, the clan frame alone was not sufficient in justifying claims to power and soon additional stories about injustice and greed, town and bush, territoriality and belonging added further narrative layers to the clan frame. These layers did not challenge the primary, clan-based claim, but added further layers to characterising clan groups and thereby adapted the clan frame to specific situations and localities. Before I outline how alShabaab was able to transcend the clan-frame, the example of Somaliland will show that, albeit culturalist frames tend towards expansion, violence does not necessarily escalate. Violence is not pursued by social structures but by people, and they can also deescalate and prevent it.
Reducing dynamics of violence and creating new state stories in Somaliland
The northwest was not excluded from clanist dynamics of violence. After the SNM controlled 
AL-SHABAAB'S RISE FROM THE ASHES: RELIGIOUS FRAMING
The following section analyses the (so far) last phase of the Somali war, the Islamist insurgency How can you differentiate between the Muslim identity from the Somali identity? To me, being a Somali and being Islamic are one and the same thing. The terms 'Somali' and 'Muslim' are synonymous in my mind. Islam provides our code of life. It is our state religion. Hence, the question of a script for our language puts our basic cultural and spiritual values at stake 73 The speech shows how deeply Islam is woven into the social fabric of Somali society but also provides an early example of religious framing. Being Somali was first equated with being
Muslim and the equation then used to take the selection of a script out of the political realm of decision making. The application of Arabic was instead portrayed as affirmation of the ethnicreligious identity, a decision against it as defiance of the very foundation of social order.
Common to both clanist and religious frames is an ability to naturalise identities and devise rules for behaviours and (political) action from them.
Although Islam was constitutionally defined as Somalia's state religion, the Somali governments followed a rather flexible approach towards Islam and Islamic laws. Facilitated by migrant workers and students in Egypt and Arab countries, Salafist revival movements gained popularity in the 1970s and 1980s. 74 After the collapse of the government 1991 and in the context of an enduring political crisis, Islamic organisations grew rapidly. While most of these organisations propagated the establishment of an Islamic state, they didn't follow a unitary ideology. 75 Only a few organisations, most notably al-Itixaad al-Islami (al-Itixaad) advocated militancy. The problems began in the time when the Somali people refused to practice Shari'a, when women went outside uncovered, when injustice and corruption became something normal, and individual rights were not respected. Some people say other states [America, Ethiopia] bring us the problem. I do not believe this. I think God brings us these problems because we do not believe. Clans kill each other, some people plunder, many women are raped, houses are taken and grabbed, and farms have been taken and so on. Where is the administration?
The bad things that we did brought the colonizers to us who used that [our weaknesses], they took advantage of the situation. The Somali problem comes from Somalis themselves. If we return to God this will be resolved. I hereby send a message to all Somalis everywhere: you have been fought [in order] to deny you your right to live by your religion; your land has been partitioned; your civilians have been killed and forced to flee; and your resources have been stolen. Every political system has been tested on our people: direct colonialism, communism, pseudo-democracy, and tribalism. Today we have to turn to God for real; our salvation is in implementing shariah... Our life is in jihad, our honour is in jihad, our victory is in jihad, and in jihad is our wellbeing in this world and the hereafter. To reach out to potential followers in Somalia and around the globe, al-Shabaab developed a sophisticated media strategy and used print media, radio, television, the internet and social media 21 to publish their images and messages in Somali, English, Arabic and, most recently, Ki-Swahili.
Recruits and followers received ideological training. 92 While this does not necessarily mean that their ideology was fully understood or shared, as Roland Marchal has rightly argued, it most likely influenced and shaped the way in which people framed their own reality.
Al-Shabaab abandoned the clan-based structure of previous regimes and integrated Somalis regardless of their genealogical background in all levels of the organisation, including the central leadership. The organisation thereby broadened political participation and provided career opportunities for previously excluded groups, which made it especially attractive for young people (excluded by the Somali gerontocracy) and for people from the so-called minority groups (excluded by birth). 93 In order to maintain their power and administer the large territories under their rule, al-Shabaab had to compromise by negotiating with elders and, to some extent, accommodating clan structures by establishing elder committees (Shuras) as consultative bodies.
Some al-Shabaab leaders were more willing to compromise than others, also depending on whether they ruled in a region with the same clan background or not, or whether they follow a more nationalist, pan-Somali agenda or a global Jihad. However, these differences were more strategic than ideological.
After their military defeat, al-Shabaab released videos in which they highlighted their past successes. 94 Interestingly, the meta-narratives of the (violent) political actors in Somalia changed little and keywords such as (pan-Somali) nationalism, anti-colonialism, development and sovereignty still structure most of their discursive repertoires. The main difference is that the politicised clan affiliations were dragged out of their shadowy existence during the war and placed in the spotlight of political practice. Clan-frames were now openly used to articulate grievances and to place responsibility with the imagined collective of a genealogically defined group. Culturalised frames are inherently conflictual and display a tendency to simplify, reduce and expand by subordinating other identity markers to the cultural frame and by naturalising differences and characteristics of the genealogically enclosed group to an extent that even intersects real experience. However, although clan quota were conceptualised as a major tool for political representation, clan frames alone were not sufficient to justify claims to power. Instead, claimants added additional layers to the primary, genealogical frame, among them 'injustice',
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'modernisation' and 'territorial' frames that justified violent deeds as 'liberation', 'defence' or '(territorial) rights'. 
